Cancel the M term, and take both sides of the equation to the power Re-arranging and taking the 1 −1 th root yields eq. (4).
1+
⇒ = 1− ⇒− 1 = −1 . Also, = 1 − . 
Derivation of eq. (3)
(
Derivation of eq. (4)
Equate UL and U(m):
( + (1 − ) ( ) 1− ) −1 = { + (1 − ) ( 1 ) 1.
Partial Co-operation: Quasi-linear Utility
Individual i maximises Ui = xi + G  subject to Mi + G-i = xi + G, with 0 <   Here G-i is the total amount donated to the public good by all individual except i. Given that
As a member of a trusting group of size m, individual i would solve:
We have:
Now establish some key properties of the m function: we have:
Now consider the function z = e  This equals one whenDifferentiating with respect toyields
Thus for e  < 1. Hence:
From which it follows that
The conclusion is that with this family of utility functions m ∈ (1, e). Thus either two or three mutually trusting individuals suffice to undermine the Nash Equilibrium.
A Generalised CES Function
Now consider the generalised CES utility function
From this we can derive:
With the unit normalisation and x = M at the limit we can derive GL:
Hence we can write:
Note that 2 drops out of this equation as at the limit agents do not contribute to the public good.
Utility for each of the m co-operators is easy to determine. Just note that each agents must spend on good x and m -1 remember that the coalition shares costs equally) before any utility can be gained. Hence, income available for expenditure on utility is:
Substitute this for M in the equation for utility (equation 3 in the text):
Hence the minimum value of m is found by solving the following equation:
The first version is the equation given in the text in implicit form, but it does not in general have an analytical solution. However, note that if  = 0 it can easily be checked that from the key equality in section 2 that the solution collapses to the C.E.S. case. Finally we have the following proposition:
First note that m is determined by the equation. Suppose, contrary to the Proposition, that m is bounded as a → 1, and that  > 1. If so, the expressions inside the second set of brackets on each side of the equation converge to unity, so that to preserve the equality m in the first set of brackets on the left hand side must go to infinity. Hence we have a contradiction, and so m → ∞.
Suppose now that  < 1. Again suppose that m is bounded. The second of each pair of brackets still converge to unity, which again requires m to converge to infinity. The same contradiction proves the proposition. Q.E.D.
The case of  = 1 is the Stone-Geary utility function for which the solution is given by
Divide through by m:
Here if → 1 the left hand side must converge to zero. Equality can only be preserved if m → ∞.
Note that neither of these proofs apply if 2 = 0.
For information here is the working for the Stone-Geary utility function.
The Stone-Geary Utility Function
The utility function is now U = (x -  G   We first find the limit solution with x = M.
Hence:
To find the partial co-operative solution solve:
Substitute into the budget constraint
Solve for x:
And for G:
So that:
A co-operative group of size m would form if:
Re-arranging:
So we find the minimum size of m from the equation: For  close to zero this will be positive as long as is not too large. For  close to unity the derivate will be negative if m < e. From this it follows that the derivative
cannot be signed in general. However, there is a presumption that it will be negative when  is small and positive when  is large.
The remaining properties of the m function are easy to settle: This is the equation for the budget constraint that appears on Figure 9 .
